Nov 26 Mumbai Terror Attacks:perspectives in intelligence counterbalance

Nov 26 Mumbai Terror Attacks
Perspectives in Intelligence Counterbalance

Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey

Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack transcends all terror enterprises in its awe. The planning, the training and the execution have been literally perfect. It surpasses the 1993 New York Landmarks Plot.

The design of the plot smacks a planning aimed at penetrating the very “protective shield” of the Indian state, where the operating watch and ward mechanism of the targeted individual institutions, targeted by such did not have much needed “ward off” mechanism in working state fall apart and outside support system made to gasp in utter desperation. Last but not the least, it sought to put the fabric of national resilience to test.

The incidence and impact of the event portend quite pervasive bearing far beyond India. It is pertinent that the blue print has since undergone successful laboratory test. T he miscreants in the field at large can easily recreate it elsewhere with here and there modifications and change. The way the miscreants could recreate1993 New York Landmarks Plot from one hemisphere to another in the Nov 26 Mumbai Terror Attack, it was but a matter of time that the module finds currency elsewhere. It has thus a dimension beyond time and space.
The paper is aimed at addressing the conceptual and applied framework of the Nov 26 Mumbai Terror Attack and examine where and how intelligence network of the country could turn out to be a counterbalance to the macabre design of perpetrators of this multifaceted proxy war. The methodology includes a revisit of the event and draws a parallel in historical perspective. Schematically, the paper is organized in analytical format and goes to focus: the Nov 26 Mumbai Terror Strategy; Tactical Moves and the Weapons of Carnage; Approach and Pattern of Terror Strike; and, the Lessons and Future Actions. In its perspective, the paper looks up for plausible intelligence coverage modules, some thing of which exists and some thing that the country would need to evolve.

Nov 26 Mumbai Terror Strategy
Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack, seen as it happened, smacks professional statecraft, involving thorough reconnaissance of all the terror attack sites: the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel; Oberoi Trident Hotel; Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal (CST); Leopold Café; Cama Hospital; Nariman House; and, Metro Cinema. Mazagaon docks and Ville Parle taxi stand were possibly as well the targets. This is evident from the fact that they were able to take position, much less move about in the interiors of the hotels with as much ease as very few with years long acquaintance could otherwise do.

The terrorists group worked in concert and seemed highly organized. With their hands on trigger, and eyes glued to indiscriminate killing, the terrorist group in action displayed a measure of depressive and narcissist characteristics. In over all conduct, in words and deeds, the group has had a singular value system. They reject diversity, diverse values, and see the world in black-white terms. It must not be an outcome of just personal human attribute. Corroborated subsequently in the interrogation of the captured assailant, the group have had training in several phases, which included training in handling weapons, bomb-making, survival strategies, survival in marine environment and even dietary habits.

Notwithstanding, they were thorough with the routes right from source to fan out locations in the city of carnage. Enroute, the group of 10 travelled in two watercrafts, the MV Alpha, a Vietnamese Cargo Ship and the Kuber, an Indian fishing boat. The Kuber was hijacked on Nov. 13, 2008 and its captain was found murdered. Aboard the Ship, the group used a satellite phone to make calls to Karachi. The group simultaneously made use of GPS map to cruise through. Six of the 10 terrorists disembarked from at Macchimar Nagar in the neighbourhood of Cuffe Parade area and the rest sailed beyond along the shore. There was absolute confidence lest they should have given cause of suspicion locals who had made queries about their profession and whereabouts. The same thing happened when the rest others of the group of ten miscreants disembarked from inflatable speed boat in Colaba. Hardly could it ever happen without organized institutional support.

The moves of the miscreants have been quite precise and measured. They broke up into smaller groups once arrived in Mumbai in the watercraft. As part of the action plan, a member of the group had already infiltrated into the ranks of the serving employee of the target institution. Choice for the position of intern chef and work place as Kitchen was again part of well thought of decision. It made person and his movement innocuous. It provided free and unquestioned access to attack and escape routes to the assailants. Again, as part of the plan, the miscreants must have created an aura of trust among the workers. The tactics paid great dividend as it enabled the group to stockpile firearms, ammunitions, grenades and food without raising eye brow of the watch and ward in a VVIP frequented hotel.

Tactical Moves and the Weapons of Carnage
After landing in Colaba, the terrorists moved north and attacked the Colaba police station, possibly as a single unit. The attack on the police command and control node was perhaps a calculated move to disrupt the police response and pin down police units. Early in the fight, the attackers killed the chief of Mumbai's Anti-terrorism Squad and two other senior officials. At least 14 police were reported to have been killed during fighting throughout the city.
From the Colaba police station, the terrorists broke up into smaller teams and fanned out to hit secondary targets throughout Mumbai. At least one police van was hijacked and the terrorists drove around the city, firing automatic weapons from the truck at random targets. In all, 10 locations, including the police station, were attacked. The assault teams struck at vital centres where foreigners were likely to congregate: the five-star Taj Mahal and Trident hotels, the Nariman House (an orthodox Jewish centre), the Cama hospital, the CST railway station, a cinema, and a cafe were all struck almost simultaneously. Two Taxis were also blown up near the airport in the north and the docks in the southern part of the city. Each of the ten terrorists, identified as Ajmal Amir Kasav (22), Soheb (20), Chota Abdul Rahman (21), Umar (22), Abu Ali (23), Fahadullah (24), Ismail Khan (25), Bada Abdul Rahman (25), Abu Akasha (26), Umair (28), carried AK-47 assault rifle, a pistol, magazines, a dozen hand grenades.
Approach and Pattern of Terror Strike
Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack and 1993 New York Landmarks Plot carry some striking similarities in historical perspectives, which leaves ground for testing a hypothesis whether it was off the shelf plan. That be show, whether the masterminds in the Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack and 1993 New York Land Marks plot were the same and/ or carried linkage of some definite description.
Both New York and Mumbai happened to be the financial capitals of their countries and home to their nations’ major stock exchanges. In both cities, the perpetrators of terror picked out and ravaged high-profile soft targets. Both plans also involved infiltrating hotel staff and booking rooms in the hotels to gain inside information and store supplies. In both cases, there have peripheral targets, meant for causing confusions and chaos. It was perhaps a tactical move to create a diversion from the main target.
A revisit of the event in Mumbai bears out a planning with sufficient home work at hand. The perpetrators of terror targeted first, transportation infrastructure such as the CST railway station. They fired indiscriminately and gave rise to panic. The terror outfit simultaneously detonated explosive devices in taxis and next to gasoline pumps. Meanwhile, part of the terror group attacked other sites around the city. It was predictably aimed at distracting the attention of the security forces from prized target: the Taj Mahal and Trident hotels and Nariman House. Attacking Cama Hospital also sowed chaos, as the injured from one scene of attack became the targets of another while being rescued. It was also aimed at playing up with psyche of the people at large.
Similarity did as well exist in the geography of the two cities. In both plots, the use of watercraft is a distinctive tactical similarity. Watercraft gave militants access at unconventional locations where security would be more lax. Both Mumbai (a peninsula) and Manhattan (an island) offer plenty of points where militants can mount assaults from watercraft. Such an attack would not have worked in New Delhi or Bangalore; these are landlocked cities where militants would have had to enter by road, a route much more likely to encounter police patrols. Being centers of trade and surrounded by water, both Mumbai and New York have high levels of maritime traffic. This means infiltrating the area from the water would raise minimal suspicions, especially if the craft were registered locally (as was the case in the Mumbai attack). Such out-of-the box tactics take advantage of security services, which often tend to focus on established threats.
Similarity did as well exist in the choice for transportation. In addition to using watercraft, both plots involved the use of deceptive vehicles to maneuver around the city undetected. The Landmark plotters used taxis to conduct surveillance and planned on using a delivery van to approach the hotels. In Mumbai, the attackers planted bombs in taxis, and at least one group of militants hijacked a police van and used it to carry out attacks across the city. Using familiar vehicles like taxis, delivery vans or police vans to carry out surveillance or attacks reduces suspicion and increases the element of surprise, allowing militants to stay under cover until the moment of attack.
It leads to an inference that the 1993 New York Landmarks authored the Mumbai plan. Considering that the group of 10 terrorists embarked to undertake Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack from Karachi, Pakistan, and the previous involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is a fact beyond any dispute, it is but quite likely that the Lashkar-e- Taiba took leaf from al-Qaeda who had worked out 1993 New York Landmarks plot.

Lessons and Future Actions
Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack has open lessons. It is again not just for India. The perpetrators of terror have exemplified their dogged will by recreating failed 1993 New York Landmarks on Indian soils even as it related to continental shift in locale after 15 long years. The module could be extended to other such places in the world for the ghastly act of encroaching upon the right to live in brazen defiance to civil order of peaceful coexistence. Quite a few of American and European cities are literally prone to suffer Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack trauma in similar way. A Yacht could possibly slip into Miami from the Caribbean as it happened from Karachi to Mumbai unless active radar cover kept vigil on each and every watercraft. Houston, Boston, Los Angeles, California and several other cities in US are perhaps as vulnerable as Mumbai from various Karachi like locations.
Nonetheless, it is a case where so to say non-state actor is overtly working for ideological and political space under covert dispensation of state actor. As a result, it has seeds of sowing extra-state pan terror regime to the utter disquiet of centuries old human efforts to set orderly life.
The hypothesis tests positive without an iota of null proposition. 1993 New York Landmarks plot was perceived to be executed with a coordinated master act of several Tactical teams such as the Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack. The high profile soft target included Waldorf-Astoria, St. Regis and UN Plaza hotels, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and midtown Manhattan waterfront heliport servicing business executives and VIP traveling from lower Manhattan to various areas in New York. The terror outfit had prepared the blue print of the attack after extensive surveillance using human probes, hand drawn maps and video surveillance. Detailed information about the lay out was gathered beforehand as in the case of Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack. This was rendered possible due to unhindered access of people at large. It was averted solely as the plotter team was infiltrated by the FBI on the basis of tip off and in Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack the casual approach of the designated state outfits such as the coast guards and the non-state personage such the locals let the strangers get off with pleasantries.
Threat to Indian state and civil society against type Nov 26 Mumbai Terror attack shall perhaps remain real until substantial metamorphic changes in the immediate and remote socio-cultural and political environments behind the growth and development of such macabre acts take place. This has to be fought b the Indian state and non-state systems in a formal way. Reorganization of state organs such the proposed federal agency may perhaps yield little dividend unless half a dozen existing agencies of different denomination in the field come to operate like five fingers with a built-in-system to draw on information, knowledge and perception of others. Gaps are to be bridged and a compatible proactive system response to all possible dimensions created.
India can draw on the British counter terror strategy against the onslaughts of Irish Republican Army (IRA) and new home grown terror outfits, which is based on four pillars: pursue, protect, prepare and prevent. There is Chinese module as well in the field. We shall have to depend yet on our own home grown system.
Counter terror infrastructure including the proposed coastal command, setting up of 20 counter insurgency and counter terrorism schools and the like hold prospect to act both as deterrence and on-time response to the eventualities. They suffer limitations to proactive recourse like the military options in more than one way. A committed intelligence counterbalance stood chance to safeguard both soft and hard terror targets.
The existing intelligence infrastructure could possibly deliver results with a change in approach. For little reckonable rationale, one and all old and new outfits in the field tend to operate in isolation both in inter and intra organization perspectives. Notwithstanding, there is one-up against each others in presenting the inputs with twists of unimaginable proportion.
The domain of terror intelligence is relatively less challenging. A public private partnership (PPP) module with multilevel indication and warning (I&W) windows could possibly help evade slips as it happened in Nov 26 Mumbai terror attack. The system could incorporate modern techniques, such as “information visualization” to zero down broad and specific terror plots of different denominations.
(The author is a defence and security analyst with chequered 4 decades long career in the government)