China terror threat myth

2008 Beijing Olympics Security Management
Myth and Reality of Intelligence Inputs on Terror Attack

Dr. S.N Pandey
Introduction
2008 Beijing Olympic Games, officially known as the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, is now a history. The opening and closing ceremonies, held respectively on 08th Aug 08 and 24th Aug 08, presented spectacles of never before workmanship in every respect. 302 events in 28 sports, held in 37 Games venues, 31 in Beijing and six others in the cities of Tianjin, Shenyang, Shanghai, Qinhuangdao, Qingdao and Hong Kong, comforted 11028 competing athletes and a vast multitude of spectators including 88 heads of states and 200 celebrities, without slightest distraught, contrary to boggy of terror attack raised by none other than the Chinese security mandarins themselves.

Non-happening of inevitable mishap of any description stands out as a sure tribute to the ingenuousness of the system in place as happening of otherwise imponderable events tests positive to manageable gloss over short of abject failure of it. It is simultaneously a pointer to the quality of statecraft. Intelligence, a process and a product of omnivorous collection, storage and analysis of information, provides much needed insight to executive actions to plug the holes, as it existed and/ or could arise. In the bargain, intelligence is a “public function” of the state arm(s) of intelligence gathering. The validity and legitimacy of the organ is, accordingly, intertwined with the “public interest”. Depending on the outreach of the intelligence inputs to policy to domestic and international power equations, it has potential to make or mar the developments. The aftermath of the invalid and illegitimate US and British intelligence inputs, tested against the parameter of public interest in the case of US policy on Iraq, particularly the US-led 2003 Iraq war is an open testimony to this effect.[1] There are umpteen number of cases world wide.

The paper is aimed at examining the validity and legitimacy of the Chinese intelligence inputs on security threat to the host cities and different venues of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games with specific reference to the magnitude and dimension of the Chinese institutional response to handle the challenges. The specifics of the Chinese intelligence remain guarded secret. There is no way either to have straight access unless the Chinese intelligence agencies come to declassify the information. It could yet be methodologically gleaned, pitting the known broad side of the Chinese intelligence in the public statements of Chinese intelligence outfits and follow ups.

Schematically, the study design delves into and addresses: the Chinese Intelligence Collection Module and Process; the Hardness and Depth of Intelligence; the Intensity of Perceived and Manifest Security Threats; and, the Viability and Aptness of Institutional Response. Data mining for the study has understandably been confined to open source materials, particularly the Chinese print media. Nothing better could have otherwise been expected as no intelligence is supposed to platter classified information. The accuracy of the findings thus draws on the upbeats of the analysis.
Chinese Intelligence Collection Module and Process
The Chinese intelligence collection module, brought to bear upon during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, reflected a rare fusion of inter agency networks, where the professional agents and political mentor shared and worked hand-in-hand to achieve simultaneously the operational and goals.
Beijing Olympic Security Command Center (BOSCC), formally set up on 30th June 2005 in Beijing, served as the front office, overtly responsible for organizing and directing all security operations. The organizational structure and function of BOSCC tend to reflect the form and spirit of collective leadership and wisdom. As elsewhere, the party functionary headed the organization. By virtue of being the main host city of the Games, the Deputy Secretary of the Beijing Municipality Party Committee Qiang Wei called the shot as Chief while Liu Jinguo, vice Minister in the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) functioned as the First Deputy Chief, Ma Zhenchuan, Director of the Beijing Municipal Security Bureau and Zhu Shuguang, the Deputy Commander of the HQ of the PAPF, as the Deputy Chiefs.[2] The BOSCC subsequently developed the operational system and rules to gain the optimum efficiency in the job.
The three Chinese intelligence setup, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), respectively responsible for domestic, foreign and military intelligence were to feed BOSCC on both the broad and specific sides of the security threat. The Chinese fourth estate, the New China News Agency (NCNA) played the much needed supplementing and complementing role for the purpose. Notwithstanding, the International Liaison Center, operating under the command and control of BOSCC since January 2008, provided necessary connects with the foreign intelligence agencies. Besides the top western outfits, the BOSCC looked for and received valuable inputs from the previous Olympic host countries, particularly Australia and Japan as well as South Korea which had experience of meeting security threats to the football World Cup in 2006.[3]
Chinese intelligence mandarins seem to have worked the conceptual frame work of this module of intelligence collection quite early. They had perhaps firmed up their direction of work as well. This is well testified from a number of public statements of different levels of stakeholders, which included the Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang. Addressing two days International Conference on Security Cooperation for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, beginning September 10, 2007, Zhou called for closer international collaboration on information sharing and risk analysis. He favoured establishment of early risk warning mechanism. He was simultaneously categorical in raising finger against the forces of terrorism. Liu Jing, vice Minister of Public Security, added to the list other sources.
The Ministry of Public security (Gonganbu), the agency responsible for internal security, apparently took lead. The Department of Intelligence coordinated the task of compilation of lists of potential trouble maker agencies and persons with the three other departments of the ministry at the national level, and the provincial, prefecture and county level outfits.[4] It included compilation of lists of domestic and foreign potential trouble maker groups. In the first stage, it drew out broad categories of suspected elements. Quite simultaneously, the Ministry of State Security (Guoanbu), the agency responsible for external intelligence got into touch with sister agencies outside. Meanwhile, the research wing of the Ministry of State Security, known as the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) started articulating thoughts on horizon and dimension of threat to the host cities and venues of the Games.[5] The views of experts in the field were collated and shared with the Ministry of Public Security. For the purpose, it got into floating and collating views expressed in its tri-monthly publication Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu (Studies in international Relations) and a number of open ended symposia. It did as well use its collaborating organizations. The Second Bureau of the Ministry of State Security entrusted with the task of collection of foreign intelligence, used non-professional intelligence agents, particularly academics and high-tech Chinese professionals for gathering general and incriminating information on foreign elements.
For long, the Ministry of Public Security worked on broad aspects of plausible threat. It concentrated on four categories of foreign and domestic sources of threats. The foreign sources of threats, targeted for the purpose included: the evangelic Christians, eager to end China’s religious restrictions; the activists, wanting Beijing to use its oil buying leverage with Sudan to end the strife in Darfur; environmental campaigner, concerned about climate change; and, militant Islamic groups, some of which were home grown. The domestic sources of threats were, accordingly perceived to be: the Tibetans, allegedly espousing independence as the Chinese officials held or real autonomy as the Dalai Lama and ilk opening expounded; the Falungong followers, suppressed as spiritual cult; the farmer groups, upset at land confiscation; and, the Non-government Organizations (NGOs), particularly those which got foreign funding and were vocal about human rights record of China.
In April 2007, the Chinese intelligence mandarins came to spell out their target in more or less precise terms. The Ministry of Public Security then issued a general nationwide order, requiring strict examinations on all people both in China and overseas, who were to witness the 208 Beijing Olympic Games. They included members of the Olympic Committee, athletes, media and sponsors. With this, the Ministry of Public Security also provided a list of 43 types of people in 11 categories to be barred from attending the Olympic Games in any situation. The ambit covered almost every set of people in hundreds and thousands through out the length and breadth of China and outside whom the Chinese leadership and establishment could consider antagonistic today and in times to come. The finer print of the list speak of involvement of all intelligence outfits.
Even as it was stupendous job to tick every one, the Chinese intelligence outfits achieved the target at a relatively fast pace, particularly in urban areas. The Public Security Stations (PHS) in a rural area is posted with a PHS Chief, a Deputy PHS Chief, a small administrative staff, and a small police force. In an urban area it had a greater number of administrative staff members and seven to eighteen patrolmen. The household section of the PHS maintained a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths, marriages, and divorces were recorded and confirmed through random household checks. The station regulated all hotels and required visitors who remained beyond a certain number of days to register. All theaters, cinemas, radio equipment, and printing presses also were registered with the local public security station, permitting it to regulate gatherings and censor information effectively. It also regulated the possession, transportation, and use of all explosives, guns, ammunition, and poisons. The PHS is entrusted with the task of controlling change of residence. They take cue from the provisions hukou (household registration) system in vogue.
At their end, the intelligence outfits under the Command and Control of the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Political Department (GPD), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLA AF) put their act together to meet all shades of security threat to the host city and venues of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. In a series of joint meetings, officials of the Second Department under the General Staff Department, International Liaison Department and China Association of International Friend’s Contacts under General Political Department, the Sixth Research Institute under the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and the People’s Liberation Army and naval intelligence exchanged notes with their counterparts in the Ministry of Public Security. Nevertheless, the Chinese intelligence mandarins did as well take expert advice of some of the reputed security hands, which included Neil Fergus, former Australian Director of Intelligence at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.
Adequacy and Hardness of Chinese Intelligence Inputs
The basic intent and purpose of the Chinese intelligence operations as such was to zero down probability of terror attacks, their intensity, time factor and locations. It differently meant getting at the capabilities and intensions of each probable source of threat. The framework of the Chinese intelligence operations, as discernible from the list of 43 set of people in 11 categories as the target, gives out much desired glimpses of China’s approach, goals and objectives and last but not the least, the predictability of the whole exercise in real time. Conversely, it speaks out whether the intelligence inputs, so collected and analysed through, could stand to the test of actionable intelligence in terms of adequacy and hardness.
The Chinese approach to get to the end source of threat in sequence after two stage value added sorting process as such is in total conformity to a mass model. It has particular relevance where the intelligence outfit has to acquit well in combing through politically high risk populace spread over to a very large geographical expanse in a given time frame. It called for disaggregating the first stage threat source and then the second stage threat source catch hold the end threat source. 43 sets of persons in 11 categories, barred to get into the host cities and venues of the events, as such, signify, respectively, the second and first stage threat source.
While conceptually sound, it suffered a major flaw. The 11 categories, so presented do not measure the test of exclusiveness. It was not again a product of chance. It was rather a studied camouflage of China’s quasi political design. For a variety of reasons, the Chinese intelligence mandarins preferred to orchestrate the stand points of political masters and ignored the basics of the discipline. The 11 categories, considered key to disaggregated 43 sets, are themselves disaggregated sets of three otherwise notional sources of threats: the Tibetan Buddhists, the East Turkestan Activists and the Falungong followers.
Box-1 Barred Category of People

Cat-I: Antagonistic Elements
Cat-II: Adherents of Falungong
Cat-III: Religious Extremists and Religious
Infiltrators
Cat-IV: Secessionists of Ethnic Minorities
Cat-V: Harmful Media Persons
Cat-VI: NGOs, prone to pose threats
Cat-VII: Persons, opposed to CPC
Leadership
Cat-VIII: Persons, awaiting judicial action
Cat-IX: Criminals under surveillance
Cat-X: Terrorists
Cat-XI: Members of illegal organizations














Box-1 testifies the point. But for Cat-II, Cat-III and Cat-IV, none other categories literally stand independent to itself. Antagonism can not exist without a reason, perceived or real. It is, indeed, central to all set of opposition. Terrorists do as well carry antagonism, for either perceived or real reason. It applies with a difference to all. The categorization is thus speculative in nature. It is not borne of hard facts. Tibetan Buddhists did not find mention even as the Chinese media much less Chinese leadership never spared a single occasion to hurl insinuations. They have been meticulously referred as the Dalai Lama clique. The cliché stands straight for the Tibetan Buddhist and wide range of advocates of Tibetan cause. Cat-III-Cat-VI and then again, Cat-VIII-Cat-XI just constitute simple reiteration and reflection of Chinese political design to brand the Dalai Lama, the East Turkestan Activists and the Falungong followers as the sources of terror threat to a noble cause such as Olympic Games. This was again a diplomatic design to silence all critics on the issue of human rights violation, and solicit support of the western powers, particularly the European Union and some of its vocal members, such as Germany and France, who can not be ignored while not acceding to their demand for more humane treatments.
The picture is little different when each of the 43 sets of persons in 11 categories, suspected to harbour terrorist designs to the detriment of either the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games or the Chinese state, are put to test against such parameters. Notwithstanding, they hold insights into the foundation and practices of Chinese criminal justice, in consonance or otherwise the tenets of jurisprudence. In turn, it is an exhibit of how surging China, swearing its credentials as responsive to reasons and rationale in the conduct of state affairs in the comity of nations.
The sets of feared after people in each of the 11 categories, as presented in Box-2, could possibly have grudge against the Chinese state as much as the leadership. They could as well take advantage of the occasion to register their discomfiture. It was yet next to impossible either for the individual player or their collectives to impair the show.
Box-2 Barred Sets of People, Category-wise
Cat-I: Antagonistic Elements
(a) Overseas anti-China forces and members of antagonistic Organizations
(b) Key figures in ideological disputes
(c) Active participants in illegal pre-natal sex identification and frequent traffic violators
(d) Antagonistic elements inside China
(e) Family members of people injured, disabled and killed in unrest and riots
(f) People who have once been sentenced for counter revolutionary/ other crimes and their family members
(g) People who have fled overseas, and who have close contacts with them
Cat-II: Adherents of Falungong
(a) Adherents of Falungong and other cult organizations
(b) Members of 14 categories of organizations and members of 7 categories of their derivatives, who follow Falungong in disguise
(c) Members from 14 categories of Qigong organizations
Cat-III: Religious Extremists and Religious Infiltrators
(a) Members of illegal religious organizations, both in China and abroad
(b) Members who have been caught by the Chinese authorities for engaging illegal religious activities
(c) People who have given illegal sermons
(d) People who have illegally distributed religious publications/videos/audio tapes
(e) People who have illegally established religious institutions/schools/sermon sites
Cat-IV: Secessionists of Ethnic Minorities
(a) The three forces of Xinjiang and their contacts in China and abroad
(b) Members of Dalai Lama’s exiled government and affiliates
(c) People who have protested for secession on ethnic grounds
(d) People who have given funds for secessionist activities in China and abroad
Cat-V: Harmful Media Persons
(a) Members of overseas media working for institutions and organizations hostile to China
(b) Media employees who persist in their antipathy and vilify the party and government
Cat-VI: NGOs, Prone to Pose Threats
(a) NGOs outside China having connections with overseas government, supporting subversive/ sabotage activities
(b) Members of all types of NGOs, who pose potential threat to 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
Cat-VII: Persons, opposed to CPC Leadership
(a) People who harbour grievances against the Party and the Government
(b) People who have filed frivolous petitions and law suits
(c) People who have complained against China to foreigners and who collude with outside forces
Cat-VIII: Cat-VIII: Persons, Awaiting Judicial Action
(a) People against whom public security agency have filed cases
(b) People whose residences are under surveillance
(c) People who have been detained/arrested on suspicion of crime or even released but, are yet being suspected
(d) All types of people, who are on run from the law or who have escaped from the crime or justice
(e) People who have been listed as wanted and are being investigated against
(f) Criminals against whom border exit restrictions have been applied
Cat-IX: Criminals under surveillance
(a) Criminals who have been sentenced and are deprived off their political rights
(b) Criminals sentenced to parole, or serving sentence outside the prison but still under surveillance or criminals detained outside the prison
(c) People sentenced to serve their term outside the reform through labour term
(d) People allowed to seek medical treatment outside the detention and reform centres
Cat-X: Terrorists
(a) Members of Terrorist Organizations
(b) Supporters of terrorist organizations
(c) Relatives of members of terrorist organizations or people with close contacts with them
Cat-XI: Members of Illegal organizations
(a) Members of political organizations not legally registered
(b) People engaged in activities in organizations that are not legally registered
(c) People from illegal organizations who use internet and whip up discontent against the Party



Morimportantly, the sets of people so suspected to harbour nefarious design, largely fall into
the category of just aggrieved lot. There are then alleged criminals of different denominations. In category-I, the listing of antagonistic elements, in overseas and at home, hold near clear reference to the participants and adherents of June Fourth Movement (Liu Si Yundong), popularly known as pro-democracy movement. While they then aroused worldwide indignation, and the PRC lost face in the West as the 27th and 28th Group Army trampled and killed thousands of demonstrating students in Tiananmen Square under tanks on 04 June 1989, the movement and its proponents are by now bygone lot under the weight of surging China. It is logically improbable that the Chinese intelligence network should have acted on hard intelligence inputs against any of the (a)-(g) set of Category-1 personnel.
It holds good for the rest of the 10 categories and their respective set of persons. In retrospect to what happened in couple of incidents, including the killing of 16 police persons in Kashi in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on 04th Aug 2008, the set of (a)-(d) persons in Category-IV and (a)-(c) in Category-X, some how test positive to the test for the possibility of near hard intelligence inputs at their back. In most other cases, the Chinese intelligence mandarins were rather speculative. In fact, at long last, Senior Colonel Tian Yixiang, head of Beijing Olympic Security Coordination Group, conceded that the perceived threat to 2008 Beijing Olympic Games emanated basically from the East Turkestan Islamic Group (ETIM).
In scope, the Chinese intelligence inputs, supposedly pursued in all purported sincerity stood a chance to touch all conceivable nook and corner, within and beyond the national border, from persons, their groups, and when all said and done, the mastermind. The proposition stood ground even as the framework of intelligence collection over stretched its boundary, perhaps in fear of leaving aside some thing some where, much as the theory sidelined the practice, and, in the pursuit, it remained skewed for all intents and purpose. While nothing cataclysmic happened, and perhaps nothing of the kind, be it a repeat story of 1972 Munich Olympic or a variant of 9/11, was ever expected, the Chinese system of intelligence operation, brought to bear upon as such during and before the Games, did not acquit as foolproof, real time intelligence cover, capable of thwarting terror design, in its perspective. The point is conversely testified from different untoward incidents that took place slightly before and during the Games, both deep inside and the heartland, in the face of total security.[6] A measure of jittery, discernible in China’s knee jerk response to the claims of Seyfullah, self styled Commander Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), about the involvement for the Kunming, Shanghai and other bomb blasts, do as well speak volumes. Had the Chinese intelligence mandarin actionable intelligence inputs at their disposal, both in term of time and location, the security mechanism in place should have been a success in preventing, much less busting the terror design, if any.
Intensity of Perceived and Manifest Security Threats
In the intelligence function, particularly where it relates to terror threat, it is common for the intelligence agencies to assess the threat level. They are based on the assessment of a range of factors including current intelligence, recent events and what is known about terrorist intentions and capabilities.
Given the intricacies in intelligence gathering, it is but rare that specific threat information is available and can be relied upon. More often, judgments about the threat will be based on a wide range of information, which is often fragmentary, including the level and nature of current terrorist activity, comparison with events in other countries and previous attacks. Intelligence is only ever likely to reveal part of the picture. We can not expect the Chinese intelligence network to do any better.

Box-3: Response Archetypes to Levels of Terror Threat
Response Level
Description
Threat Levels
Normal
Routine protective security measures, where the desired force level of security cover constituted of individual and/ or composite teams of police force, affiliated to and drawn from different departments under the command and control of the Ministry of Public Security at provincial/prefecture/ county level units.
Low and Moderate
Heightened
Additional protective security measures, where the desired force level of security cover constituted of composite teams of varying size and proportion, affiliated to and drawn from the specialized Police and PLA units.
Substantial and Severe
Exceptional
Maximum protective security measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk, where the desired force level of security cover constituted of composite teams of substantially large size and proportion, affiliated to and drawn from the specialized police and PLA units.
Critical

Chinese literature on terror, some of which articulated by quasi academic outfits of the Chinese intelligence establishment such as the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), suggested that the Chinese intelligence mandarins adhered to an archetype, nearly similar to their practice in disaster management, in defining and predicting potential threat to people and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).[7] In its perspective, it is a normative tool at the disposal of decision makers to veritable response to the threat.
Threat level, as shown in Box-3, expresses just likelihood. In absence of specific intelligence input, the time frame of incident was much a subject matter of speculation, the round about of which had to be close to best available opportunity to get to soft target. For the Chinese intelligence mandarin, it was spread over to the entire period of 130 days of torch relay, beginning 25th March 08 in Olympia, Greece, and most specifically, from 31st March 2008 when the torch was scheduled to arrive in Beijing. The dates closer to different shades of events and locations susceptible to different grades of propaganda value stood at the back of different levels of threats. It is again not absolute. It is subject to change as the threat scenario changes in the contexts of changes in the capability and intension of the primary and secondary sources of threats. In the similar vein, response levels stand to indicate needed levels of protective cover for each level of threat. As a matter of principle, both the designated threat and response levels are subject to review and change.
The job of determining the threat and response levels in China is rather institutionalized. This has its historical roots and theoretical basis.[8] It got shaped in the broad context of East Turkestan movement gaining momentum and China pedaling regional cooperation through the mechanism of Shanghai Cooperation Group (SCO) while rise of incidents of bank robberies, hostage taking and armed drug trafficking in Post-Mao era in 1980s had gone into firming up the idea.[9] The formulation and vetting of decisions takes a long and yet streamlined route of involvement of key functionaries entrusted with security tasks in various institutions and their departments both under the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council.
A quick response mechanism is in place, where, at the national level, Anti Terror Bureau under the Ministry of Public Security and the Office of the National Anti Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) play the pivotal role. In addition, all the province level political entities, with Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Xinjiang and Tibet at the forefront, have set up counterparts of NATCG at their disposal to keep in touch and take up follow up measures.
Low and moderate levels of perceived terror threats, as discernible in Box-4, found nearly absolute congruence with manifest terror threats. Outside China, beginning Olympia, Greece, on 24th Mar 08, the Olympic Torch Relay ceremony faced disruptions, protests demonstrations and banner raising in most countries in six continents, representing range of issues, particularly those related to China’s human rights records, opposition to China’s strong hand treatments to monks, nuns and common people in Tibet in March 2008, the war in Darfur, Sudan, China’s tacit support to the regime in Myanmar and Zimbabwe, North Korean defectors, territorial disputes over Spartly and Paracel Islands with Vietnam, Falungong prosecutions, issues related to political status and lives of people in Xinjiang and Taiwan. In some measure, these people fall in the category I-VI and their sets of people, the
Box-4: Congruence of Perceived and Manifest Threats
Perceived Threats/Response Category
Opportune Form and Shape
Opportune locality

Opportune Period
On Ground Manifest Incidents
Low and Moderate
Petitions/Protest Demonstrations/ Banner Raising
Within/ Outside China
24 Mar 08-24 Aug 08:Torch Relay/ Games
Boycott calls, disruption of speech, roadside demonstrations, raising of banners
Substantial and Severe
Violent Disruptions/ Explosions in Public Places/Suicide Bomber/Attack and Harm to Athletes
Within China, in particular soft targets in sensitive minority nationality habitations, venues of events, International Air Ports/PLA AF Bases/PLAN Bases

08 Aug 08- 24 Aug o8 and the intervening period slightly before and after: Games
Violent Attacks
Critical
Violent Attacks Land and/ or Sea/Air with conventional/nuclear warheads
Within China, in particular the venue of opening/ closing ceremony/Games venues/ VVIP residential locations / Critical National Infrastructure
08 Aug 08-24 Aug 08
No such incident

Chinese intelligence mandarins have been apprehensive of.

Inside China, close to the opening ceremony of the Games, and that again, in the heart of host city Beijing, disaffected groups, such as the Falungong and multitude of others, made their presence felt in different ways. As the security forces, particularly the dreaded Public Security Bureau (PSB), had set safety net in every nook and corner and stalled free movements of common people much less those under the scanner, quite a large number of aggrieved people, sought permission to petition. To demonstrate adherence to international practices, while China had set up “petition zone” at locations 25-50 km away from the venue in set Chaoyang, Fengtai and Haidian districts of Beijing, the strident conditions served as the first line of ban. Most of the applications were summarily rejected, and where they were entertained, the authorities settled the issue just as promises. There was, in the bargain, no petitioner in any of the three venues. Blogs speak of before hand detentions and persecutions. Legal activist Ji Sizun was taken into custody when he went to a police station to check whether there had been progress on his application for a protest permit to denounce corruption and demand more political rights. Two old women, who said their homes had been forcibly demolished to make way for Games-related construction, were sentenced to re-education through labour for applying to protest, though the sentence was later rescinded.[10] However, there was yet an incident of groups opposed to China's rule in Tibet having hung a Tibetan flag on the Olympic Green and unfurling a banner near the new state television headquarters, ignoring the protest parks altogether.[11]

Worst happened in Kashi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, just four days ahead of the Opening Ceremony of the Games, that 16 police persons lost life and 16 others suffered grievous hurt, in their own precinct, the border police post headquarters, allegedly masterminded by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP).[12] Chinese electronic media said two men drove a dump-truck at a group of policemen out for Early morning exercise, crashed to a halt and threw grenades or home made explosive devices. They then began slashing at survivors with knives before being overwhelmed and arrested.

Three weeks ahead of the Opening Ceremony 21st July 2008, two explosions on board two buses with a difference of an hour at a stop on People's Road West, one of the main thoroughfares of Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province had killed two persons and injured 14 others. There was then news about third explosion later in the morning, in which two people were killed and one injured, but this was discounted by local officials.Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) had then claimed responsibility for this and several pre-Olympic terror attacks. It included July 17, 2008 attack in Wenzhou and Guangzhou and May 5, 2008 Shanghai bus bombing. The leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) Commander Seyfullah had warned both athletes and spectators against plausible future attacks in several highly populated urban areas, with a view to ultimately sabotaging the Olympic Games.

These and many other such events apart, the Chinese media reported an incident of 07th March 2008 some days later, where a woman passenger onboard China Southern Airlines Ulumuqi-Beijing flight CZ6901 allegedly intended to ignite the restroom of the plane with gasoline that she had supposedly carried along.[13] There was then media blitz about busting “violent terrorist gang”, planning to kidnap athletes, journalists and other visitors to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.[14] Nevertheless, the Chinese intelligence mandarin suspected terror attack with a radiological “dirty bomb”. Chinese nuclear safety agency took eight training courses with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Anita Nilsson, head of nuclear security with IAEA, and Peter Colgan, one of her deputies, discounted any credible intelligence behind IAEA decision to help China to minimize nuclear threat.[15]

All these happenings except supposed terror attack with radiological “dirty bomb” make up part of low and moderate threats. Much what happened and the recourse that the Chinese security system then took do not necessarily call for hard on ground intelligence. Given the elements of antagonism, and discord that then existed between the Chinese state and the group of people behind the incidents, it was but much expected turn of events.
Viability and Aptness of Institutional Response
Security challenges to 2008 Beijing Olympics Games had two shades: group threat; and, lone wolf threat. In assuring safety and security to 90000 domestic and foreign spectators to the Opening Ceremony, 82 heads of states and 200 celebrities included, at Beijing’s “Bird’s Nest” and nearly seven million others during the rest of the events, the resurgent displayed a mania, some thing like tremendous face at stake. The security model sought to stamp out all possibility of untoward happenings.

To deal with group threat, both foreign and domestic in 11 categories and their respective 43 sets of persons, the Chinese model relied on “exclusion device”. It applied strict visa norms to debar suspected foreign spectators. Holding Olympic ticket was no guarantee for witnessing the Olympic Games. The Beijing Olympic organizing committee (BOOC) issued a stern, nine-page document, covering 57 topics, ranging right from a ban on sleeping outdoors to the need for government permission to stage a protest.[16]

Chinese had put in place an all-pervasive surveillance network made up of 300,000 cameras, facial-recognition technology, biometrics, and databases. Unconfirmed reports suggested China taking help of Plano, Texas-based China Information Security Technology, for identity cards for the local populace that carried radio signal devices and a chip that recorded not only a person's height, weight and identification number, but also health records, work history, education, travel, religion, ethnicity, reproductive history, police record, medical insurance status and even his or her landlord's phone number.[17] China blocked 2500 websites and allowed only government sponsored companies to broadcast audio and video files on internet. Notwithstanding, China jailed 51 on-line dissidents. In a rare show of transparency, New China News Agency (NCNA) quoted Ulumuqi Police Chief and reported arrest of 82 suspected Xinjiang based terrorists and forceful closure of 41 places of worship.[18] In all seven host cities, there were restrictions on the movements of people and their vehicles.

Over 100000 hard core PLA officers and men, 30000 of which drawn from 112th, 113th and 114th Mechanized Infantry Divisions of 38th Group Army under Beijing Military Area Command together with 100000 PAPF personnel and hundreds and thousands of volunteers guarded the host city of Beijing and 31 Games venues. Notwithstanding, China deployed two surface-to-air missiles and their launchers Hongqi-7 just 300 yards away from the Olympic Sports Center Stadium, which, during the Games, hosted pentathlon and soccer events and a mile away from the “Bird’s Nest”, the venue for the “Opening” and “Closing” ceremonies. Notwithstanding, the PLA AF and PLA Navy units secured the Games against the eventualities of air and naval terror attacks.

In the light of discussions in the foregoing sections, an institutional response to terror threat to 2008 Beijing Olympic Games of this scale was, thus, not borne of hard intelligence input. It met just perceived threat. Validity and legitimacy of the response stood ground just on less one probability of chance.



















End Notes and References

[1] The US and British intelligence inputs on Iraq were understandably skewed, and to some measure suffered the fallacy of deception as against the need to present mirror view account of the fact. This is evident from the dramatic shift in the stand between prior and after October 2002 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), together with the creation of an independent intelligence entity at the pentagon and other steps. It also refers: (a) Document 15: Director, CIA Estimates, “Iraq’s Continuing Programme of Mass Destruction”, Oct. 2002; Document 32: CIA, DIA Evaluation, “Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Plant”, May 28, 2003; Document 35: Statement of CIA Director J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s Continuing Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
[2] Xinhua, 30 June 2005, www.china-un.ch
[3] Christian Lemiere, senior China analyst with Jane’s, quoted Breffni O’ Rourke, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 17th Oct 2008 (http://www.rferl.org/)
[4] Ministry of Public Security has four distinct departments with their distinct tasks. They are: (a) the Department of Intelligence; (b) the Department of Police Operations; (c) the Department of Prison; and, (d) the Department of Political, economic and communication. There is then Provincial/ Autonomous Region level Departments of Public security, Prefecture level Public Security Bureaux and County level Public Security Sub-bureaux.
[5] The Ministry of State Security (MSS) operates through as many as 12 bureaux, individually and collectively responsible for designated and over all areas of work. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations constitute of 8th Bureau.
[6] 16 police men were killed and 16 others injured in a raid on a paramilitary border police station in Kashi in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region just four days ahead of the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. In the early hours on 04th Aug 2008, Two suspected ETIM activists reportedly used a dumper truck to run down a group of 70 police person outside the police station, before knifing them, and exploding home made grenades. Earlier, on 21 July 2008, two bomb explosions, about an hour apart, aboard two public buses, in down town Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, killed two commuters and injured 10 others. In a video, entitled, Our blessed Jihad in Yunnan, the head of Turkestan Islamic Party, Commander Seyfullah, claimed responsibility for this and several attacks, including May 2008 Shanghai attack, as a warning to those who wished to attend 2008 Beijing Olympics. Yunnan Public Security Bureau later said the explosions were “not an act of terrorism”.
[7] CICIR publishes Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu thrice every 10 days, covers world economic and political trend; publishes quarterly Xiadai Guoji Gyanxi.
[8] Pan Guang, “China’s Anti-terror Strategy and China’s Role in Global Anti-terror Cooperation, Asia Europe Journal, Vol-2, Number-4, Dec 2004, pp 523-532.
[9] Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post 9/11 Anti Terror Strategy”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, Number 2, 2006, pp 19-24 http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/doc/CEF/Quarterly May_2006/Guang.pdf
[10] www.reuters.com/articles/worldnews
[11] Ibid
[12] Jonathan Watts and Tania Branigan, “China and Olympic Terror Alert After Border Attack”, The Guardian, 05 Aug. 2008. guardian.co.uk
[13] Jiefang Junbao, 19 Mar 2008; and, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china_outside_box_terrorist_plot
[14] Chinese Public Security Ministry spokesman Wu Heping told media that the gang was busted in January 2008 while 35 suspects were arrested during March 26-April 06, 2008. The recovery of contrabands included 10 kg explosives, eight sticks of dynamite and Jihadi literature.
[15] http://www.gmanews.tv/story/96995/UN-helping-China-curb-threat-of-dirty-bomb-at-Beijing-Olympics
[16] Written in Chinese only and posted on the official Web site, the title of the guide lines read,” "A guide to Chinese law for Foreigners coming to, leaving or staying in China during the Olympics."
[17] Mathew Harwood, “China’s Surveillance State from the Olympic Games and Onward”, http:// www.inhomesecurity.com
[18] Jemmie Hesterman, “Olympic Games Just Weeks Away: Has China Mitigated the Terrorist Threat? http://inhomelandsecurity.com/2008/07/olympic_games_just_weeks_away.html